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Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions,
An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?
James J. White*
I. INTRODUCTION
Diligent first year law students study contract law with a passion
previously reserved for romantic objects and religious idols. Their
professors lead them in extensive and difficult intellectual explorations
of the wilds of contract law. There are careful analyses of why damage
recovery X will stimulate performance Y, why recovery A is appropri-
ate to encourage the aggrieved party to return to the market, and so on
and so forth. Lurking behind this year long analysis are several inartic-
ulate hypotheses: that they make rational evaluations of the threat of
legal sanctions; that they respond in other varied and subtle ways to the
law's command. Contracting parties are presented as a microcosm sur-
rounded by an impermeable membrane, a microcosm always in equi-
librium and always responding to the rules and sanctions of contract
doctrine. Of course persons in this microcosm violate their contractual
obligations but those injured by the violation are appropriately recom-
pensed by damages, or are protected by specific performance or other
order of the court. Neither the passions of man nor the effects of fire,
flood, war, the demands of the economy, the harsh pressures of depres-
sion, inflation, or shortage cross this membrane. The microcosm is free
of such influences, governed not by the law of nature or economics but
by the law of contract.
It is my contention that all the ideas expressed in the foregoing
paragraph are at best misleading, that some are downright inaccurate.
It is my thesis that contract law is a much less significant determinant
of commercial behavior in complex transactions than the typical law
student, contracts professor, or lawyer dares believe. This notion may
still seem heretical, but I am hardly the first to observe it. In his cele-
brated piece, Non-Contractual Relations in Business,I Professor Macau-
lay of the University of Wisconsin made the point twenty years ago.
Surely the legal realists of the 1920's, led by Llewellyn himself, and the
writings of Professor Gilmore on the death of contracts suggest similar
ideas.2
My contribution to this debate is to offer some empirical content
concerning contract administration in the chemical industry during a
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan, School of Law. This paper was prepared for
an address delivered as the fifth annual Foulston-Siefkin Lecture at Washburn University School
of Law.
1. 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). See Macaulay, The Use and Non-use of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAc. LAW. 13 (1963).
2. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
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time of shortage. By an examination of that contractual behavior I
hope to demonstrate the variety of sirens who compete with law for the
contracting parties' loyalty. I do that in a setting in which the parties'
behavior was in violation of their contractual obligations and was often
known to be so.
II. THE RESEARCH OUTLINE AND THE APPLICABLE LAW
In 1974 and 1975 there were widespread shortages and allocations
in the chemical industry. 3 Through lawyers in the industry, I became
aware many of them had been involved in establishing allocation
schemes and in advising their clients of the legal obligations in dealing
with new and old customers; contract and noncontract. 4
To understand the actual administration of an allocation plan, I
interviewed approximately thirty people at ten chemical and pharma-
ceutical companies during the summer of 1977. In each case I inter-
viewed those responsible for selling various products; in approximately
half the cases I also interviewed corporate buyers. In all cases I admin-
istered a questionnaire.5 The questionnaire reveals some of my prem-
ises: that each company would have an allocation plan; that most plans
would be in writing; that most would be essentially pro rata; but that
there might be other non-pro rata aspects. I began with the naive hope
that each of the chemical companies would have a written allocation
plan, and that a comparison of those plans would present a clear pic-
ture of the trade practice in the industry. Thus, I naively believed I
could define this legal responsibility under the law by a reference to the
trade practice in at least one industry.
My search for the law as defined by the behavior of the actors was
stimulated by the knowledge that the lessons from section 2-615 of the
3. Mandatory wage and price controls, instituted in August 1971, remained in effect for the
chemical industry until January 1973. Phase III, which began in January 1973 called for volun-
tary compliance with federal guidelines limiting average price increases to 1.5%. Phase 11" More
Freedom to Manage, 12 CHEMICAL WEEK 10 (1973).
Between December 1972 and March 1973, the cost of fuel and raw materials rose sharply.
Rampaging Costs Pose New Peril to CPlEarnings, 12 CHEMICAL WEEK 19 (1973). Many commod-
ities were in short supply; mandatory price controls on crude petroleum and refined petroleum
products were reimposed in March 1973; a government allocation program gave low priority to
petrochemical products. Id
In October 1973, OPEC announced a 40% increase in crude oil prices; within weeks the Arab
oil embargo began. hait the Oil Cutbacks Will Cost, Bus. WEEK, October 27, 1973, at 30. The
embargo led to cutbacks in production, increased exports to evade price restrictions, the use of
barter and tolling the chemical industry.
The embargo was lifted in March 1974, but many chemical commodities remained in short
supply. For the third quarter of 1974, the chemical price index was up 42% over the 1973 average.
Petrochemicals.- Prices Up, Supplies Down, 78 PURCHASING 11 (1975).
4. Beginning in 1974 I appeared as a lecturer on several occasions in the Practicing Law
Institute Program entitled Breach of Contract in a Shortage Economy. The magnitude of lawyers'
interest in force majeure and allocation questions was well demonstrated both by the number of
lawyers enrolled in those programs and by the questions they raised.
5. See Appendix infra.
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Uniform Commercial Code (Code), relevant statutory law, and the few
cases decided under it were quite imprecise.6 Section 2-615(b) is the
basic statement of the allocation rules:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation
and subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a
part of the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production
and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include
regular customers not then under contract as well as his own require-
ments for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner
which is fair and reasonable.
One gleans a certain set of rules from the Comment 7 and the stat-
ute. First, an allocation system need only be "fair and reasonable." It
need not be strictly pro rata. It appears that a pro rata distribution
scheme is one contemplated by the drafters as the most frequently ap-
propriate one. That conclusion is strengthened by a study of the pre-
Code and post-Code cases. 8 The Comment does state a series of for-
6. The majority of cases decided under U.C.C. § 2-615 considered commercial impractica-
bility. Only a handful have addressed the allocation issue. See Harvey v. Fearless Farris Whole-
sale, Inc., 589 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1979) (customer with unenforceable contract cannot insist on
allocation); Cecil Corley Motor Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819 (M.D. Tenn.
1974) (plaintiff failed to establish it had placed orders for cars which G.M.'s Pontiac division had
not filled); Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (court refused
to enjoin defendant from limiting plaintiff to 104% of gasoline supplied one year earlier in compa-
rable calendar month); Terry v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1977) (affirmance of summary judgment for defendant supplier); Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v.
Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974) (trial court had held supplier must provide full
delivery to contract customers, appellate court insisted on fair and reasonable allocation, presuma-
bly among contract and noncontract customers); Campbell v. Hostetler Farms, Inc., 380 A.2d 463
(Pa. Super Ct. 1977) (wet weather which prohibited planting full acreage excused seller's failure to
deliver contracted for quantity; seller's retention of about 1/6 of yield to feed his stock was a
reasonable allocation). See also White, Allocation of Scarce Goods Under Section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. A Comparison of Some Rival Models, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 503
(1979).
7. Comment II expands on the rules set out in U.C.C. § 2-615(b) as follows:
An excused seller must fulfill his contract to the extent which the supervening con-
tingency permits, and if the situation is such that his customers are generally affected he
must take account of all in supplying one. Subsections (a) and (b), therefore, explicitly
permit in any proration a fair and reasonable attention to the needs of regular customers
who are probably relying on spot orders for supplies. Customers at different stages of the
manufacturing process may be fairly treated by including the seller's manufacturing re-
quirements. A fortiori, the seller may also take account of contracts later in date than the
one in question. The fact that such spot orders may be closed at an advanced price
causes no difficulty, since any allocation which exceeds normal past requirements will
not be reasonable. However, good faith requires, when prices have advanced, that the
seller exercise real care in making his allocations, and in case of doubt his contract cus-
tomers should be favored and supplies prorated evenly among them regardless of price.
Save for the extra care thus required by changes in the market, this section seeks to leave
every reasonable business leeway to the seller.
U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 11 (1972).
8. For pre-Code cases, see Haley v. Van Lierop, 64 F. Supp. 114 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 153
F.2d 212 (6th Cir. 1945) (pro rata allocation doctrine applied in sale of flowers); Consolidation
Coal Co. v. Peninsular Portland Cement Co., 272 F. 625 (6th Cir. 1921) (pro rata doctrine applied
when shortage of coal cars inhibits shipment); Acme Manufacturing Co. v. Arminius Chemical
Co., 264 F. 27 (4th Cir. 1920) (court accepted proration doctrine but found seller had diverted its
sulphur supply to higher-priced non-contract uses); Luhrig Coal Co. v. Jones & Adams Co., 141 F.
617 (6th Cir. 1905) (proration doctrine applied in shortage of coal cars); McKeefrey v. Connells-
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bidden acts. The seller may receive a higher price from his spot cus-
tomers than from his contract customers, but he may not make an
allocation which "exceeds normal past requirements. . . ." It is im-
plicit in the statement that he may not add new customers although no
such prohibition is stated. The next to the last sentence forbids the
seller from favoring one buyer over another because the favored buyer
offers a higher price or other rewards. It is my contention that these
rules of law in which one cannot favor himself or his customers who
offer greater return for such favors above others are weak and relatively
insignificant determinants of behavior.' 0
A. The Basic Plans
Through dealing with many lawyers who had represented chemi-
cal companies during the shortages of 1974 and 1975, I was aware al-
most all the large chemical companies had experienced shortages and
had allocated many products. I also knew their lawyers had become
quite sophisticated about allocations. They had raised a host of inter-
pretative questions concerning section 2-615 and the cases decided
under it. For those reasons I started my research with the conception
that each company would have a written plan which spelled out the
allocation concerning each customer and response to each considera-
tion in intricate detail. My conception could not have been further
from the truth. Of the companies interviewed, none had a written allo-
cation plan or a fixed plan concerning its products. Although lawyers
had given oral or written advice in every case, most companies had a
different and informal plan with respect to each product. Typically,
chemical company sales staff are divided according to product line, and
ville Coke & Iron Co., 56 F. 212 (3d Cir. 1893) (proration doctrine applied in shortage of rail cars
to ship coke but court acknowledged supplier's ability to favor certain uses; here, blast furnaces
preferred over foundries); Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Piper, 133 F. 108 (3d Cir. 1902) (proration
doctrine applied in shortage of coal cars); County of Yuba v. Mattoon, 160 Cal. App. 2d 456, 325
P.2d 162 (1958) (prorate crop among lessors when quantity limited by government order); Akins v.
Riverbank Canning Co., 80 Cal. App. 2d 868, 183 P.2d 86 (1947) (prorate tomato boxes among
growers); Amsden Lumber Co. v. Stanton, 132 Kan. 91, 294 P. 853 (1931) (proration doctrine
applied in sale of cement); Ranney-Davis Mercantile Co. v. Shawano Canning Co., I ll Kan. 68,
206 P. 337 (1922) (prorate bean and beet crops diminshed by poor weather); Davison Chemical
Co. v. Baugh Chemical Co., 133 Md. 203, 104 A. 404 (1918) (proration doctrine applied but court
found supplier had diverted sulphur supply to higher priced noncontract uses); Garfield & Proctor
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Co., 199 Mass. 22, 84 N.E. 1020 (1908) (purchaser of mines
could not prorate among mine's old customers); Oakman v. Boyce, 100 Mass. 477 (1868) (early
recognition of reasonableness of pro rata allocation applied to sale of coal); Clay Grocery Co. v.
Kenyon Canning Corp., 198 Minn. 533, 270 N.W. 590 (1936) (prorate corn crop diminished by
drought). See also White, supra note 6, at 504-14.
9. U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 11 (1972).
10. One is always free to violate his contract provided he is prepared to suffer the conse-
quences. The fact the courts are unlikely to impose consequences in this context suggests the
moral force of the law is not very strong. Of course it is also possible the law here is inconsistent
with the mores and understanding of the parties. If the buyer believes in times of shortage I will
favor myself first, and if we regard that as an implicit term of the contract, I have committed only
a technical violation of the contract by doing so.
[Vol. 22
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specific corporate employees are responsible for sale and distribution of
specific products. The contractual and practical relations with the buy-
ers of various products differ from product to product and from com-
pany to company. For example, one company might sell its entire
output of product A to a single buyer. Another might have hundreds of
thousands of individual buyers for a specific product. A company
might be a sole supplier to a particular buyer or it might be but one
among ten or twenty suppliers to a particular buyer. The buyer might
have economically viable substitutes for the particular product or he
might have no substitutes. For all these reasons the allocation plans
from product to product and company to company vary according to
the circumstances.
Nevertheless, it soon became clear that the predominant mode of
allocation was a specific form of pro rata allocation. That mode was to
allocate on a pro rata basis in accordance with actual purchases over an
historic period. If buyer A had purchased one million pounds last year
and buyer B had purchased 500,000 pounds last year, buyer A would
receive twice as large an allocation this year as buyer B. This would be
true even though the contracts of buyers A and B contain identical
quantity terms. The conventional practice in the chemical industry is
to write contracts that contain minima and maxima. The practice is for
the seller to urge the buyer to take as much of the product as he will but
not to insist that the buyer take even the minimum amount in his con-
tract. This convention is so deeply imbedded that a contract which
would appear normal to a sales lawyer, namely one with a specific
quantity in which both the buyer and the seller expect to deliver that
quantity, is treated as a variant in the chemical industry. That variant
is called a "take or pay" contract, a name that sets it off from the usual
contract in which the seller agrees to deliver up to a certain amount,
but in which he does not insist that the buyer take the minimum
amount. Partly because the quantities specified in the contracts bore no
necessary relationship to the amount the purchaser had actually taken
and paid for in the historic period, or even any necessary relationship
to the buyer's current intention, most sellers allocated not according to
contract amount but according to historic "take."
Allocating according to historic take has another, and not inciden-
tal, consequence. It allows one to allocate to his contract customers
and also to his "spot" customers who have no contracts. By hypothesis,
in time of shortage, the spot prices will be higher than the prices in long
term contracts; for that reason it will be in the short run interest of the
seller to sell as large a percentage of his product to spot buyers as he
can without offending his contract buyers. The allocation according to
19821
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historic take and not by contract amounts tends to maximize the sellers'
short run profits.
Two respondents allocated according to contract amount with re-
spect to one product each. In one case the seller had long term "take or
pay" contracts and believed that it was in its long term interest to allo-
cate 100% to the buyers under those contracts even if they would not
have been legally required to do so. In the other case, the seller allo-
cated according to the contract amount as a reward to the persons who
had signed those contracts. The contracts had been signed at a time
when the seller wished to expand its facilities and needed large, appar-
ently specific, contracts in order to acquire financing for that expansion.
When the subsequent shortage came, it felt morally obligated to those
who had signed contracts containing large quantities. It felt free, con-
ceivably even anxious, to give a smaller share to those who had refused
to sign such contracts.
A third pro rata variation was to prorate according to geographic
regions. If a company which sold its products nationwide had divided
the country into four geographic regions and concluded its future lay in
the southwest where prices were higher, it might choose to allocate pro
rata according to divisions and not according to historic take. Such an
allocation might allow it to achieve both larger short run profits and
greater long run returns than a pure pro rata allocation based upon the
purchases of a prior year. At least one respondent allocated one prod-
uct according to regions.
Before one considers the multitude of variations from pro rata dis-
tribution, he should consider the variations that are possible under the
"pro rata" roof. Each of the three pro rata allocations described above
has the possibility of producing radically different distributions of par-
ticular products. If it is within the power of the seller under section 2-
615 to make such choices, he has enormous discretion even within the
pro rata rubric.
B. Contract Clauses
As one might expect, the form contracts of all the respondents con-
tained terms that dealt with allocation. Some were no -more than an
attempt to restate section 2-615. Others were clever and intricate at-
tempts to give the seller greater discretion in allocation, often in lan-
guage that might not disclose to the buyer the full scope of the sellers'
intention. The most common allocation clause was one that either sim-
ply incorporated section 2-615 as a standard, or incorporated those
standards with a specific provision concerning some idiosyncratic as-
pect of the seller's business or experience. Rarely did the respondents
refer to the rights specified in their contracts. Indeed, it was unclear
[Vol. 22
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whether any of the lay respondents appreciated that their own contracts
dealt with allocation.
As part of the study, I examined approximately thirty chemical
industry contracts from more than seventeen companies. All but three
of the contracts contained an allocation clause of some sort. Fifteen of
the contracts called for an allocation that was "fair and equitable,"
"fair," "equitable," or "fair and practical." The following is an
example:
If. . . Seller is unable to supply the total demands for any mate-
rial specified in this Agreement, Seller shall have the right to allocate
its available supply among its customers and its departments and di-
visions in a fair and equitable manner. In no event shall Seller be
obligated to purchase material from others in order to enable it to
deliver material to Buyer hereunder.
The allocation clause in these contracts would give the seller the same
rights he would enjoy under section 2-615(b). " Sixteen allocation pro-
visions included the seller itself among its customers and "its own inter-
nal needs"; "its own requirements and the requirements of its divisions,
subsidiaries and affiliates"; and "including seller for its own manufac-
turing operations of its subsidiaries and affiliates." These clauses
merely exercise an option that section 2-615(b) offers to a seller.' 2 By
enlarging the pool, however, they diminish each pool member's pro
rata share.
Ten contracts from four companies contained a clause that pur-
ported to leave the seller free to allocate upstream products in any way
it saw fit. If a seller could use natural gas to produce any of three
saleable products; methanol, ammonia, or liquid hydrogen, such a
clause would enable the seller to devote its available supply of natural
gas to the production of the most profitable of the three, even to the
exclusion of the other two. One such clause is unusually explicit:
During any period of raw material shortage, seller and producer
reserve the right in their sole judgment to determine what products
shall be manufactured of available materials. The curtailment or dis-
continuance of manufacture and sale of products pursuant to such
determination shall be excused ...
11. U.C.C. § 2-615(b) directs the seller to allocate "in any manner which is fair and reason-
able." Id. Seven contracts introduced a subjective standard of fairness, reasonableness or equity;
e.g., the seller should allocate "in any manner which in the opinion of the seller, is fair and
reasonable." In one contract the "fair and practical" allocation was left to the seller's discretion.
12. A seller "may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as
his own requirements for further manufacture." U.C.C. § 2-615(b). The section does not mention
a vertically integrated seller without further manufacturing requirements but with internal needs
for processed goods or with sales contracts for raw materials. Some contract provisions explicitly
include these uses, e.g.,
Seller may . . . allocate its supply of such raw material among its various uses thereof
(e.g., manufacturing and sales) in such manner as Seller deems practicable and allocate
its supply of such goods among such various uses thereof and among its contract and
non-contract customers in any manner which, in the opinion of the seller, is fair and
reasonable.
.1982]
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Internal memoranda from the company that employed the following
clause indicated that its lawyers thought they, too, had reserved com-
plete freedom to allocate raw materials to any of its various product
streams.'3 The clause is as follows:
Seller may ... first satisfy its own requirements and require-
ments of its divisions, subsidiaries and affiliates for such material and
for the performance of supply contracts for such materials and will
then allocate all goods produced among its customers, its own re-
quirements and the requirements of its divisions, subsidiaries and af-
filiates in a manner and amount that is fair and reasonable.
A seller's retained right to divert all available raw materials to the most
profitable of several products would affect pro rata allocation of the
various products. A buyer of methanol is faced with a difficult argu-
ment when it has contractually agreed that its supplier may discontinue
methanol production by devoting all available natural gas to the pro-
duction of ammonia or liquid hydrogen.
Two contracts purported to give the seller the right to allocate in
any manner it deemed proper. The following is an example of such a
clause:
If by reason of any such event or cause, the quantities of the
materials covered hereby, or of any materials used in the production
thereof, reasonably available to SELLER shall be less than its total
need for its own use and for sale, SELLER may allocate its available
supply of any such materials among its existing or prospective pur-
chasers and/or its own departments, divisions and subsidiaries in
such manner as SELLER deems proper, without thereby incurring
liability for failure to perform this contract.
The draftsman of this clause indicated it would give the seller the right
to allocate in any manner he pleased without regard to prior purchases
or to any pro rata scheme. One wonders whether a court would agree.
Might a court read the clause as limited by "good faith" or "fairness"?
If so, the clause might produce the same result as section 2-615.
Some of the thirty contracts appear to have been individually ne-
gotiated by the parties. These differ substantially from the form con-
tracts drafted by the sellers' lawyers; in some cases the buyer appears to
have been in the stronger bargaining position. One contract contained
an elaborate formula to be used in determining the buyer's allocation
in case of a shortage;' 4 others contained a "most favored nation"
13. A memo from the general counsel reads in part:
[I]f a shortage occurs we retain complete freedom to allocate raw materials (i) to our
affiliates and (ii) to our various product streams before we have to allocate any to make
the contracted product. However, once we do make a product, we must then allocate it
fairly among all our customers including our affiliates and internal uses.
14. In the event of a shortage of product for any reason during the period of such shortage as
specified by Seller in its reasonable judgment ("Allocation Period"), Seller agrees to allocate sup-
ply to Buyer using the following formula:
[Vol. 22
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clause. 15 In two cases, the buyers placed limits on the seller's ability to
divert raw materials upstream. 16 One contract provided for a tolling
arrangement at the buyer's option.17 Two others apparently attempted
to give the buyer absolute priority over all other purchasers from the
seller.'8 Quaere whether such an absolute priority is valid against a
third party without notice.
Some of the clauses show considerable lawyer imagination and ef-
fort. Clearly some of them were specifically negotiated for particular
transactions. One would assume in such cases not only the lawyer but
also the contract administrators would know of such clauses and would
honor them. For the most part, the boilerplate clauses added little to
the buyer's or seller's rights under section 2-615. No lay respondent
referred to a contract clause in answer to any of my questions about his
rights or behavior. One lawyer respondent questioned how one would
determine whether a "most favored nation" clause was being honored
by another party. There had been some discussion among the com-






A. is Seller's available amount of Product for current Allocation Month.
B. is Average monthly amount of Product Delivered to all customers of Seller (including
Buyer and Seller's captive consumption) during 12 months immediately preceding Allo-
cation Period.
C. is Annual Quantity for current Calendar Year.
D. is Annual Quantity for last Calendar Year.
E. is Average monthly amount of Product Delivered to Buyer during 12 months immedi-
ately preceding Allocation Period.
For purposes of implementing this formula, Seller's sole obligation is to provide the resultant ratio
of A to B, and not the actual figures for A and B.
15. In the event a shortage of relevant supplies or raw materials occurs which effects -'s
ability to produce __ under this agreement, so that an allocation of manufacturing capacity or
sales of product is necessary, no other customer of - shall be given a priority higher than
- and - 's allocated amount shall be at least directly proportionate to the availability of
relevant raw materials.
16. An example of such a clause is as follows:
In the event of shortage of supplies or raw materials or the occurrence of any other
event or force majeure . . . seller agrees that if the production of product at the plant is
curtailed that seller will exercise reasonable efforts to limit the curtailment of the produc-
tion of product by an amount which, on a proportional basis, does not exceed the per-
centage curtailment of other products produced on the equipment and through the same
process.
17. In the event of any shortage of supplies or raw materials or the occurrence of any
other event of force majeure . . . Seller agrees that if the production of Product at the
Plant is curtailed that Seller will exercise reasonable efforts to limit the curtailment of the
production of Product by an amount which, on a proportional basis, does not exceed the
percentage curtailment of other products produced on the equipment and through the
same process.
18. Notwithstanding any provision contained in this section [concerning pro rata alloca-
tion] to the contrary, if during the first contract year the aforesaid shortage results from
[supplier's] inability to deliver at least 25 million pounds of Amines produced in the New
Plant, [buyer] shall have the right to purchase a total of 25 million pounds of Amines
pursuant to this Agreement, subject nevertheless to a Force Majeure situation which
affects [supplier's] ability to deliver Amines produced in Existing Plants.
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the refusal of a seller to allow buyers' auditors to examine the seller's
books. Although some skillful effort by lawyers was invested in these
clauses, I saw little to suggest the contract administrators knew about or
relied upon them in making their allocation decisions.
C. Justifiable Deviations from Pro Rata Distributions
Although a pro rata distribution method was the norm for almost
all products in all companies, every company deviated from its pro rata
model in many ways. Consider first the deviations which are reasoned
and clearly justifiable as "fair and reasonable" under section 2-615. A
common case in which seller gave more than a pro rata share to buyer
was that involving "defense rated" orders under which federal law
would call for a preference to a particular buyer.' 9 Several companies
reported such orders and granted such buyers more than a pro rata
distribution.
A second area that would certainly be regarded as a permissible
deviation from pro rata under a fair and reasonable distribution system
is one to help a buyer who would otherwise suffer extraordinary eco-
nomic injury or the social cost would be great if the seller insisted upon
a pro rata distribution method. Several respondents reported they
granted more than a pro rata share to certain buyers who would suffer
severe economic consequences if they did not get that share. For exam-
ple, one company granted more than the pro rata share of vitamins to
an animal food manufacturer who was halfway through a six year cycle
to qualify the animal food under some federal agency standards. Had
they cut off their distribution, the company would have had to start
over and would have lost the several years that had already passed in
the six year cycle. Similarly, one company reported it gave more than a
pro rata distribution of chlorine to a municipality that used the chlorine
to purify its water. If one assumes the seller in such cases did not make
an added increment of profit by favoring the municipality or the
animal food company, such a distribution would be regarded as fair
and reasonable.
In some cases, the buyers' purchases during the historic period
under consideration had been abnormally low because of a plant shut-
down or for similar reasons. In such cases the seller allocated more
than a pro rata share to such buyers in recognition of the fact those
buyers had an equal claim with those who had been in operation in the
historic period.20
19. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.26, 211.103, 221 (1980) which accorded priority to Department of
Defense delivery orders for crude oil or petroleum products when orders were given a priority
rating by the ERA Administrator.
20. Two cases decided under U.C.C. § 2-615 recognize the seller's ability to make adjust-
ments to a pro rata scheme to accomodate unusual circumstances affecting the buyer. See In-
[Vol. 22
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A final justifiable deviation from pro rata occurred when a partic-
ular product was never thought to be a part of the pool for distribution.
For example, one of the companies traditionally entered into long term
contracts with specific buyers under which it would build plants adja-
cent to the buyers' facilities. The contract provided that the entire out-
put of the new plant would be dedicated to the buyers' adjacent
manufacturing plant. The seller would then take the contract to a
financial agency for use in procuring financing for the construction of
the plant. In many cases the product was delivered through a pipeline
"over the fence." In such circumstances neither the buyer, the seller,
nor any other buyer of that particular product could have a legitimate
expectation that any of that product at any time, whether in short or
long supply, would go to third parties. During a shortage no reason-
able expectations would be injured if the entire output of such a plant
were devoted to the traditional buyer.
Because there is a better opportunity for deviousness, a similar al-
location where the seller is also the buyer is more questionable. As-
sume, for example, that a seller asserts he has always used the entire
output of plant X internally and thus in times of shortage he has no
obligation to allocate the output of plant X. Are we to treat the seller in
that context differently than the seller who has made a long term con-
tract and built a plant adjacent to a buyer's plant? Put that way, the
answer would seem to be no. However, since there is no external re-
straint and presumably in many cases no external evidence such as a
long term contract to show the practice and commitment, the courts
should be more hesitant to accept the argument as a reasoned deviation
from pro rata distribution in the latter case than in the former where
there is an external buyer.
D. Unjustqfiable Deviations from Pro Rata
The inarticulate premise of section 2-615 is that a seller should not
be free in time of shortage to disregard his long term commitments and
favor short term buyers who will pay higher prices. Although it is clear
termar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Terry v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 962, 140 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1977). In each case, gasoline station operators
challenged Atlantic Richfield's allocation scheme. The Pennsylvania scheme generally limited re-
tailers to 104% of gasoline supplied during the corresponding calendar month one year earlier, in
1972, but made exceptions in circumstances involving "the lack of a 1972 sales history or the
occurrence of a material intervening event." 364 F. Supp. at 82. The federal district court opinion
provides additional information about Atlantic Richfield's method of handling unusual
circumstances:
In the event a base month is determined to have been adversely affected by a natural and
non-recurring event (e.g., traffic disruption, reconstruction, temporary closure, etc.), Re-
gion or Zone Managers may approve an alternate basis which shall be an average of the
nearest preceding and successive full month on each side of the period of interruption.
id at 91. The federalcourt refused to enjoin Atlantic Richfield's allocation procedure. The Cali-
fornia court affirmed a summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield.
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the seller may treat himself as a customer, section 2-615 forbids giving
himself an additional, unjustified share. Rarely could one justify the
addition of new customers under section 2-615 in time of shortage.
Discussions with chemical company lawyers, before and during the in-
terviewing process, disclosed that they were well aware of those
problems. The written materials furnished by some lawyers indicates
they were careful to point out those difficulties to their sellers. Never-
theless, I received a surprising number of admissions that sellers had
engaged in non-pro rata distributions which almost certainly were in
violation of section 2-615. In two cases, these admissions were made in
the presence of company lawyers who were surprised and obviously
discomfited by the admissions.
In the remainder of this article I propose to focus on those devia-
tions not because I regard them as particularly evil or interesting in
their own right, but because they will disclose something about the
power of the law to control behavior in a corporate organization.
When one conforms to his contractual and statutory obligations, an ob-
server can never tell whether he did so because of those obligations or
for some other motive. When one deviates from those obligations, at
minimum we know those obligations were not powerful enough to out-
weigh the reasons for deviation. Thus it is only in those cases that we
can hope to learn something about the power of the law to control be-
havior in this context.
One deviation from pro rata allocation which was widely prac-
ticed, probably in violation of section 2-615, was the diversion of an
upstream product. Assume for example, a seller uses natural gas to
produce products A and B, and that in normal times he uses 50% of his
natural gas to produce A and 50% to produce B. Assume also that in
time of shortage the seller will make much more by producing B than
A. May he then allocate a larger share of his natural gas to produce B,
thus maximizing his profits? By doing so he expands the pie to be
shared by the buyers of B and shrinks the pie to be shared by the buy-
ers of A. Several respondents reported they routinely engaged in such
allocations. Some of them believed these allocations to be justified and
not controlled by section 2-615. They concluded their only obligation
was to make a fair and reasonable allocation of the amount of A or B
manufactured.
Surely this is too narrow a view of section 2-615. Unless the buy-
ers of A knew of and explicitly or implicitly agreed to the upstream
diversion, I think a court would not find such a diversion to be justified
under section 2-615. One of the respondents reported he thought most
buyers failed to understand the possibility of upstream diversion. On
the other hand, some sellers included a contract term that authorized
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such upstream diversion.21
Second, most of the respondents conceded they granted more
than a pro rata share to internal uses. As indicated above, in some
cases such deviations would be justified but it seems likely that most
were not. One respondent stated he allocated only after he had satis-
fied his own needs. He concluded his obligation was to allocate only
that part left over after his company had been satisfied. Purchasing
managers interviewed were unanimous in their belief the sellers satis-
fied their internal demands before they commenced allocation. The
representative of one company was remarkably candid: "We sure as
hell are not going to short our own plant." To favor oneself is, as he
put it, "the strength of a backward integrated company." Moreover, he
indicated that next year he might be working for the president of the
division he had shorted this year. The implication of his remark was
that one's corporate career might well be inhibited by having granted
less than the full amount to a corporate superior. Whether the internal
use of more than a pro rata share was a de minimus share of a particu-
lar product or a significant share, I cannot say. I did not inspect the
books, and the respondents gave me no quantities.
A third deviation from pro rata distribution which was obviously
in violation of section 2-615 was sales to new customers. Two of the
respondents explicitly and one implicitly stated they took on new cus-
tomers in the time of shortage. Except in extraordinary circumstances,
it would be impossible to justify the addition of new customers under
section 2-615 during a shortage. The rationale for such action was
purely economic. As one respondent put it, one should have a right to
"salt the market" because times of shortage were when one "added to
his market share." He indicated they might serve a new customer
where in prior times they "never got beyond the lobby." Such motiva-
tion is understandable, but it is not the kind of motivation the cases or
the statute would recognize as reasonable and justified.
Finally, all the respondents admitted granting more than a pro
rata share to certain buyers for reasons which probably could not be
defended under section 2-615. For example, two companies acknowl-
edged they granted greater than pro rata shares to particularly good
customers. One buyer indicated that by buying a product which was in
long supply and one he did not particularly need, he was able to get
more than a pro rata share of the product. He indicated the products
were not related but he was led to understand he could not buy a signif-
21. For example, "During any period of raw material shortage, seller and producer reserve
the right in their sole judgment to determine what products shall be manufactured of available
materials."
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icant quantity of the product in short supply without also buying a
comparable quantity in long supply.
Most companies reported that they "swapped," ie., engaged in
barter transactions. Although no respondent stated it got an additional
share by swapping, it is hard to conceive a reason for swapping except
to gain an additional share. Barter transactions are cumbersome and
are the rare exception in a modem economy. The only justification for
engaging in such transactions is the thought that by granting another
person a product in short supply, one gives him a higher price and thus
encourages him to return the favor in the form of a disproportionate
share of his shortage product. It is my hypothesis the swaps were stim-
ulated by an interest in gaining more than a pro rata share of a particu-
lar seller's distribution, and that in fact they were executed principally
for that purpose.
By comparing the various buyers' and sellers' allocation behavior
with the law and by examining sellers' motives one can attempt to
measure the influence of section 2-615 and contract obligations on
these particular sellers. Let us turn to that task.
III. THE LESSONS
What can one learn from the foregoing? It seems certain many of
the sellers failed to conform to their contractual and statutory obliga-
tions. Had all the facts been known and brought to the attention of a
court many sellers would have had to pay at least nominal damages.
Why was the law insufficient to the task? By analyzing the foregoing
rules of law and the behavior of the sellers, one can demonstrate that
the rules of law cast only a pale light upon the landscape of commercial
contract administration, and that that light is insufficient to hold at bay
a variety of wolves and harpies who threaten and beckon to the typical
contract administrator.
First, one must understand why the law's power is so slight. To
begin with, the law is vague. Section 2-615 says only that one must
allocate in a fair and reasonable manner. When one applies that exhor-
tation to the complex and varied fact patterns seen even in a single
industry, the difficulty of stating certain rules becomes apparent. Who
can say with confidence, for example, that the allocation of an up-
stream product such as natural gas to diminish the downstream product
is an unreasonable or irrational allocation method and in violation of
section 2-615? One will search in vain for cases on that point. Even if
one assumes it was done to maximize the sellers' profits in apparent
violation of the policy of section 2-615, he might justify such an alloca-
tion on the basis that everyone in the chemical trade expects such a
thing to be done and thus it is not a violation of any buyer's legitimate
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expectations. At the outset, vagueness of the law, combined with the
complexity of the fact patterns, means even some who are intelligent,
diligent, and well meaning will be mistaken about the law's commands
in a variety of circumstances.
Because the law's command must be executed not by lawyers, but
ultimately by lay corporate agents, the problem is compounded. I
doubt any of the lay respondents had read even a single case concern-
ing allocation. Few of them knew of the existence of section 2-615 and
hardly more than a few had any familiarity with the Code. Thus, each
layman had to depend upon his lawyer to apply the law to the particu-
lar facts and give direction.
A comparison of the ways in which companies went about that
task is informative. One company conducted a slide show in which a
lawyer presented a text together with a variety of slides entitled "Can
We Tilt?". In other companies the lawyers gave written memoranda to
particular persons in answer to specific questions. Nearly all the law-
yers had given oral advice to various sales representatives. It should be
clear if lawyers are simply responding to questions of the lay seller, the
seller has only a small chance of discovering how the law would apply
in his particular case. By hypothesis the layman is ignorant of the law.
That ignorance alone may foreclose him from asking for the necessary
legal assistance. Thus the light of the law, already faint, must pass
through a second filter. The lay actor, a corporate seller, must appreci-
ate his ignorance, seek advice, and apply that advice to his own com-
plex facts.
A third filter is a function of the way in which information about
legal responsibilities is transmitted within a corporate organization.
Without exception, the lawyers are staff personnel, not the supervisors
of those who make the selling decisions. Lawyers are not in the opera-
tional chain of command; rather, they are likely to come from "head-
quarters," render advice and return to headquarters. Only in the
remotest sense do their careers depend upon the profitability of the var-
ious divisions of the company. The layman in charge of contract ad-
ministration may listen respectfully to the lawyer's description of the
law, but he will listen even more carefully to his supervisor's instruction
about profitability, sales, and performance. The point was put nicely
by a representative in one company when he asked how one could ex-
pect him to "short" a person who was the president of another division
for which he might be working in the next year. One suspects even
when the law shines brightly from the lawyer, that brilliance is over-
powered by a greater light from the superior. The superior may con-
clude the lawyer's advice conflicts with his division's interest. He may
find it inviting to seize upon any equivocation in the lawyer's directive
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or convenient to distort that advice to conform to his conception of his
economic interest.
For these three reasons, as well as others, the law's power is signifi-
cantly diminished by the time it reaches the line contract administrator.
Its meaning is uncertain as it is applied to complex facts. Its meaning
may be diluted and distorted by its inefficient transmission from the
lawyer to the layman. Its power is further diminished because the one
transmitting does not supervise the decision maker.
For the purpose of the foregoing factors we have assumed a per-
son, who if informed, was generally willing to comply with the law.
What of those who are not willing to comply with it and see their eco-
nomic interests so thoroughly in conflict with the law that they do not
wish to follow it? It is for those that we have sanctions, injunctions,
orders for specific performance, consequential, and other 'damages.
Doubtless in some circumstances the prospect of such sanctions has an
important impact upon parties to a contract. Consider three reasons
which demonstrate why that is almost certainly not true in the chemical
industry.
First, the complexity associated with the performance of the typi-
cal chemical contract renders it unlikely any party will find out or be
able to prove that another has not complied with the allocation rules.
Based on the respondent's reports, I discovered various sellers favored
themselves, particular customers, or added new customers. Only by
happenstance or through very expensive investigation could one ferret
out such information from an uncooperative seller. Consider a large
chemical company that sells hundreds of products to thousands of buy-
ers. Remember that section 2-615 does not demand all sales be on a
pro rata basis, only that they be fair and reasonable. How then does
one prove that as a recipient of product X, he has received less than his
share because there has been an unfair and unreasonable allocation of
product X to another person? Absent a gross deviation from a pro rata
allocation, one would have difficulty proving such distribution. Only
the prospect of a large pay-off would justify the expense necessary to
prove such a fact.
Second, the relationship between the buyers and sellers in the
chemical industry mitigates against lawsuits. None of the respondents
reported any significant lawsuits. Several had received threats of suits;
one or two had been sued in minor matters, but none had been in-
volved in major litigation related to contract claims on shortage prod-
ucts. Part of the reason is the cost one incurs in undertaking such
litigation. If a seller allocates some part of the product and one is able
to continue production with that allocation, albeit less efficiently and
less profitably than if he received a larger amount, he runs the risk of
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forfeiting that share by commencing a lawsuit. Not only does one run
the risk of forfeiting that amount, he also risks interfering with tens or
perhaps dozens of sales and purchases of other products from and to
the other potential litigant. Because chemical companies buy from and
sell to other chemical companies on a large scale basis, the disruption
of all those transactions may well be more expensive than the expected
pay-off arising from a lawsuit.
The final and related point which inhibits litigation is the kind of
injury suffered by one who is receiving a modest but unjustifiably re-
duced allocation. By hypothesis that party is not suffering the kind of
catastrophic injuries which occur when one cancels a long term supply
contract like Westinghouse did with its uranium contracts, or when a
large and expensive product fails and causes millions of dollars of eco-
nomic loss. Rather, the plaintiff is likely to suffer some significant but
less than catastrophic loss in profits. Thus, when he makes the calcula-
tion described in the foregoing paragraph and weighs the expected re-
turn of a lawsuit against the likely disruption of the business
relationship, he will probably decide against the lawsuit.
Yet this is only part of the puzzle. The law is weak not only be-
cause it is poorly transmitted through various filters to reach our hypo-
thetical contract administrator, but also because its sanctions are
distant and unlikely to be suffered. Its weakness is magnified because it
must compete with a series of conflicting motivations. The corporate
employee must serve his company's selfish interests; he must also serve
his own selfish interests. That the legal obligation will conflict with the
selfish interest is commonplace; presumably that is why we have con-
tract sanctions. My study shows the motivation of the contract admin-
istrator is more complex than one might think.
The contract administrator has to protect his own interests. Even
if it might be in the long range interest of his company to follow the law
and even if its profits might be maximized by doing so, he may choose
to violate the rules of section 2-615. He might, for example, allocate to
an internal use because he sees such a diversion to be in his personal
interest. He may perceive that such allocation will endear him to one
with power over his advancement within the company.22
Also important are the contract administrators' relationships with
persons associated with the buying companies. Contract administrators
repeatedly reported that they gained more than they otherwise would
have, or expected to receive additional orders after the shortage was
22. Ideally of course, a company should not be set up so that personal goals of the employees
conflict with the corporate goals and cause them to do things that are not in the interest of the
corporation. I doubt such an ideal corporation exists, and certainly in this case it is easy to hy-
pothesize a situation in which an employee will be influenced by his interest in personal advance-
ment to violate the rules of § 2-615.
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over because of their particular relationship with persons in the buying
or selling departments of other companies. They reported these bene-
fits would last only as long as the same personnel were in those organi-
zations and they had varying opinions about how long such benefits
were likely to survive a shortage period. It was obvious their personal
and moral obligations to persons in those companies would influence
their pattern of purchases both during and after the shortage. 23
IV. CONCLUSION
After one has examined barriers to the law's reach and has ob-
served the manifold pressures to escape even its weakened grasp, one
wonders if the law has any effect at all on contract administration in a
shortage. The respondents confessed a variety of behavior that was in
violation of section 2-615 and the cases. Yet none of them reported any
significant legal challenge from a party who might have been injured
by their deviation from the law's dictates.
Even when the parties conformed to the rules of section 2-615,
their conformity may not have been dictated by the rules of law but by
intelligent self interest. Pro rata allocation based on historic take is
probably a sensible economic compromise between one's long and
short term interests. I saw no evidence such an allocation method was
adopted because the law of contracts called for it.
If the law was incapable of shaping these contract administrators'
behavior, are we to conclude it is truly an artifact of twentieth century
commercial life, an external substance of no significance to the eco-
nomic life of these companies? The data falls far short of proving that,
yet it does not conflict with that idea. I found considerable evidence
that lawyers were diligent in attempting to interpret the law, were care-
ful to advise their clients, but found little evidence there was any signif-
icant change in any company's behavior in response to the law.
If one assumes for the moment that my hypothesis is correct;
namely, that the law is in fact irrelevant in determining the behavior of
chemical companies during allocations, what can one conclude about
commercial contract law in other areas? Are we to conclude that buy-
23. It brings me to a question with which I concluded a number of my interviews, namely,
"Why do you sin contracts at all?" A norm in the chemical industry is to put maximum and
minimum quantities in a contract and for neither party to insist upon purchase of either the maxi-
mum or the minimum. By 1977, contracts fixed prices only for a very short period, if at all, by
tying them to some outside measure. Thus the contract failed to do two of the things a law student
would traditionally expect a contract to do, set the important terms of price and quantity. Sales
representatives did not have very good answers to those questions. Some reported the specifica-
tions of the product were important and they wished those to be written into the contract. Others
pointed out the contract quantities tended at least to be related to the amount of the take, and thus
were useful for planning considerations. Some thought the boilerplate on the back of the contract
might be useful in a warranty dispute. The answers on the whole however were not persuasive.
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ers' and sellers' behavior in contract formation, in contract modifica-
tion, in determining whether to take actions that might be regarded as
breach of contract are all taken in ignorance of or without regard for
the law? Of course that is not true. Obviously when there are millions
of dollars at stake, when the risks and costs are very high, any sensible
businessman will consult his lawyer. However, my findings are com-
patible with the idea that a large part of the behavior a lawyer might
conceive as in response to the dictates of the law is in fact taken in
ignorance or disregard of it.
How should one shape his behavior in response to that learning?
For the house counsel it will confirm his darkest fears about his client's
disregard for his advice. It will demand a search for new ways to make
one's client listen and conform. For the legislator and judge, it will call
for more humility. The lawmakers must be more willing to make the
law conform to the sensible practices of business and to accept the fact
that the law is incapable of changing those practices except at great
cost. For the teacher of contracts, it means acceptance of a diminished
role. If his students are truly to understand contracting parties' behav-
ior perhaps he must integrate his contract teaching more fully with the
conflicting currents of commercial life.
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1. Did you ever allocate in a situation of commercial
impracticability?
2. If so, on an ad hoc basis or pursuant to a plan?
3. What gave rise to the allocation?
4. Have you ever thought about or planned for allocation but
never had occasion to implement?
5. What products? Different plan for each product?
II. Allocation Plan-Basis for and Built-in Exceptions
1. Has allocation ever been a subject of your contract
bargaining? What result?
2. Do you have a term in your form contract that purports to
give you greater allocation rights than you would have with-
out such a term?
3. What legal constraints were considered in formulating an al-
location plan?





4. Other factors or goals considered
(a) Ethical limitations
(b) Profit maximization
(c) Maintaining customer relations
(d) Public relations
(e) Government relations-minimizing intervention
(f) Other
5. Did you reject any methods as illegal or of questionable
legality?
6. Is your allocation (a) pro rata on an historical period or
(b) pro rata on present contracts or (c) other? (ise., how do
you determine the proration)?
7. Do you allocate the entire supply of the company or do you
make different allocations from different sources? (whether
those sources be purchasers or plants)
8. If you allocated on the basis of sales during a historical pe-
riod, (a) how did you choose that period? (b) did you make
any exceptions and if so, on what basis? (e.g.), for those who
made no purchases during that period or who normally
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purchased or who made unusually large purchases during
that period.)
9. Is there a difference between a shortage in an "upstream
product" (which will be used by you to produce a variety of
products to be resold) and shortage in a single use product?
10. Are certain uses favored or disfavored?
(a) As part of the plan or ad hoc
(b) Defense rated orders
(c) Socially beneficial (e.g., hospitals)
(d) Purchase for resale
(e) Other
11. If you allocated specially to a certain use, did you then sub-
tract such priority allocations from the customer's later regu-
lar allocations?
12. Are certain customers favored or disfavored?




(d) Any consideration of customer's economic or other
hardships (e.g., impending insolvency or ability to con-
vert to other, available good?)
13. How might one aid a favored customer? E.g., "borrowing
ahead," barter of scarce goods, tolling?
14. Have you ever taken on new customers when you are allo-
cating to others? At a different price than the contract cus-
tomers? At a high enough price to bring supply and demand
into equilibrium?
15. Do you distinguish among spot buyers? (some in and some
not in plan?)
16. In a shortage situation did you treat the regular spot custom-
ers the same as or different from contract customers? Do
you feel legally obliged to give them the same treatment?
17. Are customers dealt with in classes? How do you define
classes of customers? (by their end use of the product or by
the product consumption of the seller?)
18. If you have classes of customers for a single product, (i.e.,
the users of the product itself and the users of the derivative
that is purchased from you after some processing) how do
you allocate between those two classes?
19. Did you ever lease a portion of your plant or use it to pro-
cess somebody else's raw material when you could not ob-
tain the product on your own? Did you get a share of the
output and if so how did you use that output?
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20. Do customers have advance notice by contract clause or
otherwise of the possibility of allocation and the method to
be used? In a form contract?
21. How have you notified customers of a shortage?
22. Have you attempted to arrive at agreements with customers
before unilateral imposition of an allocation? Successfully?
23. In your allocation arrangements, did you hold back a certain
percentage to handle contingencies or particularly insistent
and disruptive customers?
24. To what extent do you believe that operating personnel for
whatever reason deviated from an agreed allocation plan,
either out of ignorance, to satisfy a particularly insistent cus-
tomer or for other reasons?
25. Have you formerly used but improved upon a method?
III. Profit Maximization
I. Under what circumstances do you believe you can justify
the greater allocation to an end product use that has a higher
profit margin than to another product use?
2. To a customer who is paying a higher price for the same
product than another customer? (if you have allocated, has
it increased your profit on the allocated item?)
3. In the case, if any, in which you deviated from your pro rata
scheme, did it ultimately prove to be in your economic inter-
est to do so? (L e., was the profit margin higher on those sales
than on the average to the other allocatees?)
IV. Challenges to Allocation
1. Has there ever been a challenge to your proposed or actual
allocation?
2. Threat of or actual litigation? Result?
3. Have you anticipated litigation or prepared defenses?
V. Receiving End Experiences as an "Allocatee"
1. Have you ever been on the receiving end of an allocation?
2. Did you bargain about the allocation?
3. What were your arguments?
4. Was it a form contract?
5. Were you ever pressured to accept less than a full order?
6. Were you involved in litigation as a buyer?
7. Reactions in general
VI. Law Reform
1. How are the UCC, antitrust laws responsive or not respon-
sive to the problems involved in allocation?
2. How could the law in this area be improved?
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